Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. I believe the AADC must be clearly designated by joint doctrine and named far in advance of the establishment of a JTF. This is necessary because of the complex requirements for C4I and the challenges of operating in a joint/combined environment.
Future threats from the air will not come from organized air forces, but from unmanned weapons with greater accuracy and capabilities. Future theater missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles will emerge as the "poor man's air force of the 21 st century". Joint Theater
Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) forces are necessary to defeat these future threats.
Unfortunately, both current and proposed doctrine and structure do not provide the nation with the best recipe for success. JTAMD is not a "piece it together on the ground type of operation" but requires detailed planning, integrated C4I and realistic peacetime training.
It will be imperative that within the JTAMD structure mission responsibility falls under a single commander and that commander should be the Area Air Defense commander (AADC). The JTAMD mission area spans all levels of war and the systems that perform the JTAMD mission must be included in all force packages. Future reductions in force structure require an effective JTAMD force that can operate across the total spectrum of conflict. Additionally, to defeat the emerging threats JTAMD must be an integrated part of the development of a national missile defense capability for the 21st century.
I envision that the nation will be required to deploy a flexible JTAMD force as battalion, squadron or single ship task force with strategic missions. This force may operate as a part of a larger theater force or may actually deploy as a small JTAMD JTF. This was done when NATO and the US deployed a combined Dutch/US Patriot force (battalion size unit) to provide population protection and to keep Israel from entering the war during Desert Storm.
While not called an AADC, the senior commander on the ground filled the role (O-6 level), without a US JFACC assigned. Most recently (1998) JTF Noble Safeguard was the established in Israel as part of a US -Israeli JTAMD force. The JTF Commander was responsible for the integration of U.S. and Israeli Patriot in a combined defense. The task force was comprised exclusively of JTAMD forces and the JTF Commander was designated as the AADC. 3 The world environment requires the United States not only to execute the JTAMD mission today but also to build a greater capability to defeat future threats.
Successful JTAMD operations are a must to ensure protection of our forces and those of our allies. Today we are called upon to protect large civilian population centers of our allies but in the future we must be prepared to defend our homeland from the same Theater Missile (TM) type threats. The threat from TMs has not been a revolutionary development but rather it has evolved for the past 50 plus years. It will be helpful to review some history before we examine the JTAMD forces of the 21 st century.
Past, Present and Future
The fear of an attack on our forces and population centers from enemy missiles is not a new threat. Theater missile defense had its birth in World War II with the German missile attacks against England. The V-1 and V-2 missile attacks initially caught the Royal Air
Force by surprise. Fortunately a combination of organization, early warning, point defense weapons systems (Anti Aircraft Guns), bombing of launch sites and direct attack of the incoming missiles by fighter aircraft, reduced the effectiveness of the attacks.
However, it was not until the launch sites were captured by ground forces that the threat was eliminated.
The allies faced a similar threat 50 years later during the Gulf War. Although we were not surprised by the threat, we were caught relatively unprepared when Iraq launched SCUD missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States reacted quickly to counter the threat, however our Theater Missile Defense strategy and capability to defeat the threat was essentially unchanged since World War II. Space based assets replaced airships and ground based radar found on the English coast for early warning. The quickly modified PATRIOT weapon system (not designed to engage ballistic missiles just as AA guns were designed to engage aircraft not missiles) was used as point defense for high value targets, just as AA was used to engage incoming V-1 and Early United States JTAMD efforts can be traced to the cold war. Threats of long range missiles focused our nation's defensive measures on early warning and passive defense such as personnel protection, but the basis of the deterrent program was based on the strategic offensive of the nuclear triad to attack the Soviet Union. The first shift to an active defense and offensive operations to destroy incoming missiles began with the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization in 1983. The SDIO concept and mission was based on President Reagan's "concerns about our ability to defend against a strategic ballistic missile attack from the Soviet Union". 5 SDIO efforts were focused on the mainland of the United States as the theater of operations with the mission to defend against a ballistic missile attack originating from the Soviet Union.
In 1991 with the break up of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, we began to change the way we looked at missile defense. We shifted our focus from defense of the mainland to theater level defense where our forces or would be deployed or where we may be called upon to defend allied population centers. At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait our Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capabilities were lacking. The only system and measure of defense the nation had was to quickly modify and remission the Patriot Air Defense Weapon system to engage SCUD missiles.
(The Patriot system was specifically designed to defeat masses of Soviet block aircraft in NATO). While the degree of Patriot's success can be argued extensively, this is not the major point. The loss of 28 soldiers killed and 160 wounded by a single SCUD missile is not a failing of a weapon system's ability to defeat a threat but rather a nation's failure to recognize and develop robust offensive and defensive capabilities and strategies to defeat the threat. We had developed tanks, ships, fighter aircraft and helicopters to defeat any cold war threat but we had not prepared our forces for the old yet new emerging threat of theater missiles.
Perhaps one of the biggest impacts of this new threat is the impact on shaping a nation's policy or decision process, to enter into an armed conflict. For example, the deployment of a NATO/PATRIOT unit and other assets to Israel was key in preventing Israel from entering the Gulf War and potentially damaging the fragile Arab coalition. The continued proliferation of WMD makes this threat too dangerous to ignore. Even though we have made strides in technology, our nations TMD capabilities rest with space based warning and ten PATRIOT battalions, a limited capability for the nation.
Today, JTAMD development and acquisition efforts within the Department of Defense (DOD) rest largely with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The DOD and BMDO broad strategy for TMD has three major components:
1) Preventing and reducing the threat (counter proliferation)
2) Deterring the threat 3) Defending against the threat.
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This paper will focus on the third component of the DOD strategy of defending against the threat. Specifically, I will examine DOD's organization for leadership in JTAMD development as well as current and future supporting Joint Doctrine and service responsibilities. We must refine our JTAMD organization for combat development, planning and execution to maximize our future capability. This need for a JTAMD organization is an implied task of full-dimension protection outlined in Joint Vision 2010.
"The primary prerequisite for full-dimensional protection will be control of the battle space to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels. Full-dimensional protection will enable the effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for the enemy. It will be essential, in most cases, for gaining and maintaining the initiative required to execute decisive operations. The concept will be proactive and defensive actions that may extend well into areas of enemy operations. Active measures will also include an integrated, in-depth theater air and missile defense that will exploit Service-unique capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track and joint forces. Passive measures will include the inherent protection provided by information superiority and dispersal to increase our warning of attacks." 7 As outlined above the threat from missiles is not new. We must next take a more detailed view of the 21St century air and missile threats. The asymmetrical enemy that we face in 2010 and beyond may be a small group of terrorists, large ethnic group or a third world country with an organized military force. The ease of obtaining required technology provides a wide range of options for many potential enemies.
Named the "The Poor Man's Air Force", the chart on the next page highlights the advantages to shift efforts in the direction of missiles vice aircraft.
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The threat from theater missiles has been with us for many years and will only grow more challenging with technology improvements. The proliferation of these weapons will continue as long as the former Common Wealth of Independent States, China and North Korea find the sale of these weapons and their technology as a profitable way to help support their economies.
Today over 26 countries possess TBM's and over 100 countries have some form of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles or unmanned aerial vehicle capability. 10 Perhaps the greatest challenge of all will be the potential capability for all platforms to carry small but very lethal weapons of mass destruction. 11 We will now look at how the Department of Defense has attacked this joint threat. I will first review DOD organization and then examine current and proposed Joint Doctrine for JTAMD.
Chapter 4 Current Organizations
Prior to the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union, each service focused primarily on the development of air defense systems or strategic missile defense systems, with very little attention on the development of TMD systems. Following the Gulf War DOD recognized the need to develop and field a robust TMD system. However, progress was hampered by traditional service rivalry over mission areas, budgets and the service's inability to speak with a common voice. DOD and Congress wanted a lead agency to put JTAMD development on a faster track.
Furthermore an organization was needed to link all SDIO, service developments, technology, and lessons learned in order to develop a national missile defense capability. It was decided that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) would be formed out of the standing SDIO.
BMDO has been given budget authority over the services for all JTAMD acquisition. Today this organization is the key player full filling the war fighting CINC requirements.
The problem is that BMDO is an acquisition focused agency and while they should be a partner in the process they should not be the leaders in operational issues such as command, control and campaign planning. My point is not to discredit BMDO. They are doing an outstanding job in many areas, but I believe there is a better organization that will meet the warfighter's needs faster and in a more holistic fashion. headquarters would enable a single organization to be a capability provider to each CINC and help to establish national missile defense priorities. Now that we have established a need for a joint TMD headquarters we must now look at strategy, joint doctrine and service capabilities before we can refine the structure and organization of a joint organization for JTAMD. Prior to any discussion concerning doctrine, we must first look at the approved joint requirement for theater missile defense. The Mission Need Statement for Theater Missile Defense, defines a TM as a ballistic missile, cruise missile, or air to surface missile whose target is within a theater or which is capable of attacking target in a theater. The mission of TMD is"
DOCTRINE
protect United States forces, US allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest to the US from TM attacks." The Mission Need Statement was approved by the JROCM-064-9 1 on 18 November 1991. The purpose of TMD is to counter the TM threat by coordinating and integrating the four operational elements of TMD into cohesive and coherent combat operations. The four operational elements are defined as follows:
Passive defense -measures taken to posture the force to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of a TM attack.
Active defense -operations taken to protect against a TM attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or destroying TMs in flight.
Attack operations -operations taken to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize TM launch platforms and their supporting structures and systems.
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) -systems used to coordinate and integrate the joint force capabilities to conduct and link passive defense, active defense, and attack operations.
14 For the past several years these four elements for TMD have been the guiding principles for current operations, planning, exercises, force structure requirements, and weapons systems development. Under the new Joint Publication 3-01, these fundamentals have been included as a subset of the overall counterair mission. The basic problem with the proposed doctrine is that by bringing TMD principles under the counterair umbrella the specific TMD focus has been diluted or lost. The "counterair opponent" would argue that the proposed doctrine fails to adequately address the force protection issues in favor of offensively oriented attack operations. The "counterair proponent" would argue that theater missiles are business as usual. They argue Joint Publication 3-01.5 goes too far and that a theater missile is just another target set in an air war.
Further they would argue that the current structure does not need to be changed but is more than adequate to accomplish the mission.
A close examination of the evolving threat across the spectrum of conflict as outlined in JV 2010 shows that we will not face a enemy fixed wing threat, but most likely a missile or UAV threat. While we should be addressing all threats we must build the necessary doctrine to handle the most likely and most dangerous threat.
Evolving Doctrine -Joint Publication 3-01 Key Points
The major shift from previous publications is that 
The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
The Joint Force Commander (JFC) will designate the JFACC for the Joint Operations Area (JOA) based upon the component commander that has the preponderance of air assets and the best capability to conduct a joint air campaign. The JFC will also give initial guidance for the JTMD campaign. The JFACC derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. 18 The JFACC develops the air operation plan to support the JFC objectives that includes the following; The AADC within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters.
Joint force commander level guidance may include (but is not limited to):

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Airspace Control Authority (ACA)
The JFC also designates the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) who is responsible for operating the air space control system by developing an Air Space Control Plan and Air Space
Control Order (ACP and ACO). The ACA does not receive forces either TACON or DS or assigned. The JFACC will many times perform the role of the ACA to ensure close coordination and interoperability can be achieved during combat operations. The ACA is the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area.
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 Coordinate and integrate the use of the airspace control area.
 Develop broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among units within the area of responsibility / joint operations area.
 Establish an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the joint force commander, provides for integration of the airspace control system with that of the host nation, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements.
 Develop the airspace control plan and, after joint force commander approval, promulgate it throughout the area of responsibility/joint operations area.
 Provide the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to meet contingency situations that necessitate rapid employment of forces.
 Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply assumption of operational control or tactical control over any air assets. 23 Now that we have looked at the doctrinal foundation, we should turn our focus to the different service views. We should also examine some future concepts that will allow us to apply current doctrine in a different framework. The Army and Navy believe the new counterair doctrine standardizes or makes things so rigid that the JFACC will always be Air Force. This goes back to the long standing argument of whether missiles are a subset of the counterair fight, just another target set, or are they so important they demand special attention in doctrine and organization. I firmly believe that when one studies the threat in JV 2010, one cannot draw any other conclusion than missiles and UAVs must be addressed as a separate and distinct threat demanding detailed doctrine with agreed upon command and control procedures. If JTAMD is too wrapped up into the counterair doctrine then the clarity found in Joint Publication 3-01.5 would be lost.
The future air threat across the spectrum of conflict support specific doctrine for JTMD.
A detailed examination of the likely threat we will face in 2010 and beyond shows that very few if any potential enemies will posses a fixed or rotary wing air force of any size. The majority of our potential enemies will rely upon unmanned aircraft or missiles. The future joint counterair campaign in these situations will be predominately a DCA campaign, within the guidelines of Joint Publication 3-01 or a JTAMD campaign under Joint Publication 3-01.5. It is extremely important to maximize our DCA assets when we look at how we may respond given multiple threats and limited resources. We may decide to harbor our fixed wing assets to be prepared to face a larger or more significant threat from another MTW. The JTAMD fight may become a strategic economy of force effort in one theater while we observe other regional developments.
Here are a few plausible scenarios:
1) An internal faction that has recently procured a small number of cruise missiles and UAVs is threatening country X. Country X has strategic mineral reserves, with friendly trade relations that make them of interest to the United States. The potential type of warheads the threat has is unknown. The US long standing engagement policy has obligated us to support this regional friend. However, we do not want to risk American lives or deploy a major force to the region. The JCS has recommended deployment of a defensive system for protection of the capital and a major seaport of the country.
Additionally, we will deploy special operations forces to help locate and destroy the launch sites and platforms. This is a case where we need the capabilities for passive defense and active defense and do not require a JFACC afloat or on shore. For example an Aegis cruiser may be all we need to provide for the protection and integration of all other JTAMD activities.
2) Country Y is threatened by its neighbor that just acquired a TBM capability. Earlier this year Country Y declared their new F-15/16 Air Wing fully operational. However they lacked any TBM protection for their major city and seaport. The United States decides to deploy a ground base defensive system and a Marine Expeditionary Unit to lead local forces in the search for the launch sites. Once the launch sites are detected they will be destroyed using Country Y's new air power. In this case there is no need for a JFACC or US air power to achieve the objectives. However the need for a command element, or an AADC does exist.
In both cases it may be more desirable to deploy US air power but we may not because of tensions elsewhere in the world, or lacking of popular or political support. Additionally we have experienced the inability to obtain basing rights making the use of air power difficult requiring the use of sea based assets. Futher the employment of defensive capabilities may be more politically acceptable to the world community.
Common to both these cases is the need for a capability to conduct a detailed IPB, develop an appropriate plan and execute a JTAMD operation as a stand-alone mission. The review of doctrine thus far, clearly outlines the AADC as responsible for this mission. However, Joint Publication 3-0l calls for the JFACC to normally be assigned as the AADC. More than likely the JFACC would have to be stood up and resourced before any planning could take place.
What if we did not want to resource a JFACC at that particular time? It would be more effective, and in accordance with doctrine, if there was an operational headquarters that could provide the above capability both in crisis and deliberate planning situations. In the next section we should look deeper into the functions of the AADC.
BASIC FUNCTIONS
We should compare basic functions of the JFACC and AADC as prescribed by Joint Publication 3-01, 3-01.5, 3-52 and 3-56.1 to help establish basic AADC requirements.
Comparing the data in the above chart and reviewing proposed and approved doctrine points out certain principles that are common to all players in an integrated air defense operation. These principals are;
 Common BMC4I Structure  Common shared understandable air picture  Common, doctrine tactics, techniques and procedures  Centralized Planning and decentralized execution 25 No matter which set of doctrine manuals is finally agreed upon, it is clear that there is a common set of requirements for the AADC. The greatest injustice would be for these requirements to be lost or diluted into another set of forgotten JTTPs. The functions of the AADC must remain as doctrine to be effective.
Knowing the basic functions of the AADC, we can now look at specific capabilities that the AADC must possess in order to perform those functions. The AADC must have a planning and execution capability that will operate in and support joint operations. It must be a fully interoperable system that can be used with all service structures. (This assumes that other aspects of joint operations are being developed as well such as joint data links and communications systems.) The functions that follow are core requirements that must be accomplished to ensure success in the JTMD war fight. Using these core requirements as a baseline we can see how each one applies to recent JTAMD exercises, studies and actual operations. We will examine the lessons learned in the next section as a means to validate these basic requirements. 28 Chapter 8
Applying Lessons Learned
The lessons learned in Desert Storm have resulted in many changes to JTAMD. been since, we still "carve up" battlespace. The impact of this type of an arrangement was that weapons systems were not employed to their maximum capability. 27 During UFL 97 it was revealed that the JFACC, who remained dual hatted as the AADC, lost the ability to conduct the JTMD campaign. The JFACC became so involved with the other aspects of the counterair fight particularly the intensity of the OCA fight, that JTMD issues were not handled efficiently or in a timely manner. 28 I know from personal experience that in a previous UFL, the same was true. In UFL 1995 the JFACC who was serving as the AADC failed to alert TMD forces resulting in effective surprise red force TBM launches. As a result the blue force capability to generate sorties was severely degraded and the blue ground forces ability to defend was challenged in the early phases of the exercise. During our recent visit to 7 th AF it is apparent that they are just now coming to grips with how to fight the JTMD piece of the counterair campaign. TMD is truly a joint fight and requires a joint solution. In the next section we will look a possible solution for leadership of JTMD.
Publication of
Chapter 9 Recommended Solution
The best approach to this challenge is the formation of a joint operational headquarters responsible for theater air and missile defense. This organization should be designed, structured and equipped as a deployable JTF command and control headquarters. The command would receive its forces from service components just as any other unified command does today. This This headquarters would be our key to building a joint success story on the 21 st century.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
The formation of an organization that is the nations JTAMD JTF Headquarters is a means of full filling part of the national military strategy that requires a joint force capable of providing full dimension, multi-layer force protection. This headquarters will have the ability to look deep, advise the CINCs and develop the war plans that will prevent our relearning hard lessons about the TMD threat.
In this paper I have argued that the requirement for a permanently structured and resourced organization to fulfill theater air and missile defense as well as national missile defense doctrine, material development, and operational requirements is key to fulfilling Joint Vision 2010. Such an organization would serve to ensure interoperability, tailor force packages for deployment, conduct JTAMD defense design in support of OPLANs, and maximize use of the future joint battle space.
This AADC headquarters would provide for the single joint warfighter lead that is missing today. This standing organization operating on a daily basis is our path to success in winning the future war against theater missile threats and provides the foundation to protect our homeland in the future.
